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Moot point. At best we would be just underfoot of the major players either way. Showing up late didn't matter because our presence wasn't required. If anything it would only serve to piss off the boys with nukes.
Canadian RCAF and RCN aircraft provided ASW in areas where American aircraft could not operate due to insufficient capabilities. Land based Argus aircraft and Trackers off the Bonaventure were involved in this aspect.
Canadian ships stepped up their tempo of operations along the American eastern seaboard so those ships could be diverted to the blockade zone and also tracked Soviet subs while working with American subs.
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Canadian ASW Operations
A logical point of departure to re-look at Canadian ASW operations is the
sighting of the “Zulu”-class submarine alongside the fleet auxiliary, Terek, on 22 October.
Those who participated in the operations in the Canadian area agree that this was the start
of the ASW side of the crisis. There are accounts of a second submarine sighting in the
general area north of the Azores two days later, but they were never substantiated. It is far
more likely that the “Zulu”-class sighted on 22 October returned to its patrol station off
the northeastern seaboard after replenishing from Terek. If this was so, then the contact
gained and held intermittently by RCAF Argus aircraft from 26 to 29 October was the
same submarine – the speed of advance was a steady five knots which is realistic, but it
cannot be given any classification higher than “possible” because it was never sighted,
contact was only maintained acoustically. Contact was lost on the 29th at the same time
as all the submarines, even those in the Caribbean went silent as the crisis reached its
most dangerous point. However, contact was gained on another possible submarine late
on 2 November as it tried to seek shelter in the Soviet fishing fleet working Georges
Bank in the Gulf of Maine.
The location of this new contact was consistent with the
projected speed of advance of the contact held earlier and, more significantly, it made
absolute sense for a submarine to seek out the fishing fleet and replenish from the tanker
Atlantika which was also there. Further, the ELINT vessel Shkval, which was suspected of supporting Soviet submarines, was in the same general area and had been moving
around the areas being used by the Canadian Navy and RCAF for ASW operations. That
some Soviet fishing vessels tried to drive off Canadian destroyers attempting to pin down
the submarine seems to increase the level of probability. But that was not the only contact
in the area. While this contact kept the Canadian maritime forces busy, a completely
separate submarine contact was occupying the US Navy in an area about 250 nautical
miles to the east of Cape Hatteras. This contact was in the same general area as the
ELINT trawler Shkval which had been sighted on 29 October.
The RCAF was also involved in the US Navy’s ASW barrier established between
Newfoundland and the Azores on 27 October. Once the barrier was in place the US Navy
had to ask Canada for help in providing air cover (in a “pouncer” role while also
providing additional surveillance coverage) for the patrol area furthest from
Newfoundland because the US Navy’s Lockheed P2V Neptune patrol aircraft did not
have the necessary endurance to maintain a useful patrol there whereas the RCAF Argus
did. This support was provided from 29 October. Although the barrier’s main purpose
was to catch submarines in transit between their home bases and patrol areas, concern
existed that a missile-firing “Zulu”-- or “Golf”--class might be in the area and might
attempt to close to firing range (about 350 nautical miles).
The planned response in such
situations was to arm the patrol aircraft with a nuclear depth bomb (NDB) to be used as a
countermeasure of last resort if a submarine attempted to launch missiles. Little reliable
information is available on the RCAF barrier task or on the possibility that RCAF Argus
embarked NDBs, and so that remains one of the remaining mysteries of the Cuban
Missile Crisis.
By the middle of the day on 27 October, American and Canadian naval staffs
agreed that contact had been made on seven separate Soviet submarines: four in the area
to the east of the Windward Passage (the four “Foxtrots”), one in the area to the south of
Cuba, and two in the WESTLANT/Canadian area.
Contact had also been made with
several other possible Soviet submarines, but these did not have the same degree of
reliability. The situation was confusing and gave rise to considerable concern. For
instance, on 30 October the commander of RCAF maritime air forces, Air Commodore
Clements, informed the chief of the Air Staff that even though the view from Ottawa was
that the crisis was practically over, the submarines had not left the area. In his own words,
“there have been 5 positive, two highly probable, and 4 possible submarines in Western
Atlantic in last week. No indication yet of any movement out of that area. Never since
last war has such a situation existed.
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Did Deif fuck up? No. It was his watch and his call. If he fucked up we wouldn't be talking about it.
Dief got lucky that first, US-Soviet diplomatic efforts produced results in the nick of time, and second, that his inaction was corrected for by others.
It isn't any kind of secret that Dief and Kennedy had not much care for each other, but Dief picked a
really poor time to try and piss Kennedy off and make a point, with Ivan rolling into the neighbourhood with the United States AND Canada in the crosshairs.
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Having the balls to say no to BS is called sovereignty.
You call it balls, I call it one of two things. Either Dief couldn't resist an opportunity to piss off John (at the expense of our national defence) or he genuinely had no idea what the hell was going on down around Cuba.
And on the topic of sovereignty, Diefenbaker was hardly one to squak about it. Under his watch the Canadian military aviation industry died a painful death, in its place we got (useless) BOMARC's and unguided nuclear missiles locked down under a dual key system. Our Air Force could not deploy its more powerful weapons systems (BOMARC's and CF-101's with Genie Missiles) without American authorization.
What did he know about sovereignty again?
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we can't afford to be anyone bitch to have our boys catching lead for someone elses war like a bunch of lemmings.
It wouldn't have been "someone elses war", make no mistake it would have been our war. You don't bomb Detriot and spare Windsor.
If the rounds started to fly, we would have been a target. Our military facilities and cities. And Dief thought it good idea not to have the military at ready when the world was at the closest it had ever been to World War 3.