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PostPosted: Fri Aug 10, 2018 8:22 am
 


From US-CERT and Unclassified TLP WHITE


Quote:
National Cyber Awareness System:

North Korean Malicious Cyber Activity
08/09/2018 01:02 PM EDT

Original release date: August 09, 2018
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have identified a Trojan malware variant—referred to as KEYMARBLE—used by the North Korean government. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.

US-CERT encourages users and administrators to review Malware Analysis Report (MAR) MAR-10135536-17 and the US-CERT page on HIDDEN COBRA - North Korean Malicious Cyber Activity for more information.


On the same subject there's MUCH more detail and this is also Unclassified TLP WHITE


Quote:
National Cyber Awareness System:
AR18-221A: MAR-10135536-17 – North Korean Trojan: KEYMARBLE
08/09/2018 09:29 AM EDT

Original release date: August 09, 2018
Description
Notification
This report is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.
This document is marked TLP:WHITE. Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.
Summary
Description
This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Working with U.S. Government partners, DHS and FBI identified Trojan malware variants used by the North Korean government. This malware variant has been identified as KEYMARBLE. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity, visit https://www.us-cert.gov/hiddencobra.

DHS and FBI are distributing this MAR to enable network defense and reduce exposure to North Korean government malicious cyber activity.

This MAR includes malware descriptions related to HIDDEN COBRA, suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques. Users or administrators should flag activity associated with the malware, report the activity to the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and give the activity the highest priority for enhanced mitigation.
This malware report contains analysis of one 32-bit Windows executable file, identified as a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). This malware is capable of accessing device configuration data, downloading additional files, executing commands, modifying the registry, capturing screen shots, and exfiltrating data.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:
• MAR-10135536-17.stix
Submitted Files (1)
e23900b00ffd67cd8dfa3283d9ced691566df6d63d1d46c95b22569b49011f09 (704d491c155aad996f16377a35732c...)
IPs (3)
100.43.153.60
104.194.160.59
212.143.21.43
Findings
e23900b00ffd67cd8dfa3283d9ced691566df6d63d1d46c95b22569b49011f09
Tags
trojan
Details
Name 704d491c155aad996f16377a35732cb4
Size 126976 bytes
Type PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD5 704d491c155aad996f16377a35732cb4
SHA1 d1410d073a6df8979712dd1b6122983f66d5bef8
SHA256 e23900b00ffd67cd8dfa3283d9ced691566df6d63d1d46c95b22569b49011f09
SHA512 0092900bf4ca71c17a3caa225a4d7dcc60c7b58f7ffd173f46731db7f696e34b2e752aefaf9cedc27fe76fe317962a394f1be2e59bd0cffaabd9f88cc4daedcc
ssdeep 3072:IDdXEYhXxS550wwiY0Pe6Q1vLo4lJnCtea:EXEEXxcQxZ
Entropy 6.264656
Antivirus
Ahnlab Trojan/Win32.Agent
Antiy Trojan/Win32.AGeneric
Avira TR/Agent.rhagj
BitDefender Trojan.GenericKD.4837544
ESET a variant of Win32/NukeSped.H trojan
Emsisoft Trojan.GenericKD.4837544 (B)
Ikarus Trojan.Agent
K7 Trojan ( 0050e4401 )
McAfee GenericRXBP-FF!704D491C155A
NANOAV Trojan.Win32.Agent.eqcfki
NetGate Trojan.Win32.Malware
Quick Heal Trojan.IGENERIC
Symantec Process timed out
TACHYON Trojan/W32.Agent.126976.CTO
Zillya! Trojan.NukeSped.Win32.5
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule rsa_modulus { meta: Author="NCCIC trusted 3rd party" Incident="10135536" Date = "2018/04/19" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "n/a" description = "n/a" strings: $n = "bc9b75a31177587245305cd418b8df78652d1c03e9da0cfc910d6d38ee4191d40" condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and any of them }
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
PE Metadata
Compile Date 2017-04-12 11:16:04-04:00
Import Hash fc7dab4d20f23681313b91eba653aa21
PE Sections
MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy
47f6fac41465e01dda5eac297ab250db header 4096 0.627182
30d34a8f4c29d7c2feb0f6e2b102b0a4 .text 94208 6.633409
77f4a11d375f0f35b64a0c43fab947b8 .rdata 8192 5.054283
d4364f6d2f55a37f0036e9e0dc2c6a2b .data 20480 4.416980
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ v6.0
Relationships
e23900b00f... Connected_To 104.194.160.59
e23900b00f... Connected_To 212.143.21.43
e23900b00f... Connected_To 100.43.153.60
Description
This application is a malicious 32-bit Windows executable file, which functions as a RAT. When executed, it de-obfuscates its application programming interfaces (APIs) and using port 443, attempts to connect to the hard-coded IP addresses listed below. After connecting, the malware waits for further instructions.

--Begin hard-coded IP addresses--
100.43.153.60
104.194.160.59
212.143.21.43
--End hard-coded IP addresses--

Static analysis reveals that this RAT uses a customized XOR cryptographic algorithm displayed in Figure 1 to secure its data transfers and command-and-control (C2) sessions. It is designed to accept instructions from the remote server to perform the following functions:

--Begin functions--
Download and upload files
Execute secondary payloads
Execute shell commands
Terminate running processes
Delete files
Search files
Set file attributes
Create registry entries for storing data:(HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WABE\DataPath)
Collect device information from installed storage devices (disk free space and their type)
List running processes information
Capture screenshots
Collect and send information about the victim's system (operating system, CPU, MAC address, computer name, language settings, list of disk devices and their type, time elapsed since the system was started, and unique identifier of the victim's system)
--End functions--
Screenshots

Figure 1 - Screenshot of the cryptographic algorithms the malware used to secure its data transfers and C2 sessions.
100.43.153.60
Ports
• 443 TCP
Whois
Domain Name: KRYPT.COM
Registry Domain ID: 4620809_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.godaddy.com
Registrar URL: http://www.godaddy.com
Updated Date: 2016-02-25T03:39:29Z
Creation Date: 1998-05-04T04:00:00Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2024-05-03T04:00:00Z
Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC
Registrar IANA ID: 146
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@godaddy.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: 480-624-2505
Domain Status: clientDeleteProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited
Domain Status: clientRenewProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientRenewProhibited
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited
Name Server: NS1.CF.KRYPT.COM
Name Server: NS2.CF.KRYPT.COM
Name Server: NS3.CF.KRYPT.COM
DNSSEC: signedDelegation
DNSSEC DS Data: 2371 13 2 503AEB51F773BBCA00DB982C938895EF147DDC7D48A4E1E6FD0FE5BE7B98DA0D
URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/wicf/
Last update of whois database: 2018-06-28T02:39:11Z
Relationships
100.43.153.60 Connected_From e23900b00ffd67cd8dfa3283d9ced691566df6d63d1d46c95b22569b49011f09
104.194.160.59
Ports
• 443 TCP
Whois
Domain Name: SERVPAC.COM
Registry Domain ID: 81803816_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.godaddy.com
Registrar URL: http://www.godaddy.com
Updated Date: 2013-12-27T04:46:10Z
Creation Date: 2001-12-31T08:29:34Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2018-12-31T08:29:34Z
Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC
Registrar IANA ID: 146
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@godaddy.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: 480-624-2505
Domain Status: clientDeleteProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited
Domain Status: clientRenewProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientRenewProhibited
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited
Name Server: NS1.SERVPAC.COM
Name Server: NS2.SERVPAC.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned
URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/wicf/
Last update of whois database: 2018-06-28T02:40:41Z
Relationships
104.194.160.59 Connected_From e23900b00ffd67cd8dfa3283d9ced691566df6d63d1d46c95b22569b49011f09
212.143.21.43
Ports
• 443 TCP
Whois
netnum: 212.143.21.0 - 212.143.21.63
netname: Nana10-LAN
descr: Nana10-LAN
country: IL
admin-c: NV6695-RIPE
tech-c: NV6695-RIPE
status: ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by: NV-MNT-RIPE
created: 2011-02-17T09:16:56Z
last-modified: 2011-02-17T09:16:57Z
source: RIPE

person: Nana 10 LTD
address: 1 Korazin str
address: Givataim, Israel, 53583
mnt-by: NV-MNT-RIPE
phone: +972-73-7992000
fax-no: +972-73-7992220
e-mail: domains@nana10.net.il
nic-hdl: NV6695-RIPE
created: 2010-08-04T09:51:11Z
last-modified: 2011-02-17T09:01:21Z
source: RIPE

% Information related to '212.143.0.0/16AS1680'

route: 212.143.0.0/16
descr: 013 Netvision Network
origin: AS1680
mnt-by: NV-MNT-RIPE
created: 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z
last-modified: 2009-03-26T10:55:12Z
source: RIPE
Relationships
212.143.21.43 Connected_From e23900b00ffd67cd8dfa3283d9ced691566df6d63d1d46c95b22569b49011f09
Relationship Summary
e23900b00f... Connected_To 104.194.160.59
e23900b00f... Connected_To 212.143.21.43
e23900b00f... Connected_To 100.43.153.60
100.43.153.60 Connected_From e23900b00ffd67cd8dfa3283d9ced691566df6d63d1d46c95b22569b49011f09
104.194.160.59 Connected_From e23900b00ffd67cd8dfa3283d9ced691566df6d63d1d46c95b22569b49011f09
212.143.21.43 Connected_From e23900b00ffd67cd8dfa3283d9ced691566df6d63d1d46c95b22569b49011f09
Recommendations
NCCIC would like to remind users and administrators to consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization's systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.
• Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
• Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
• Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
• Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
• Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
• Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
• Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
• Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
• Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
• Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
• Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumbdrives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
• Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
• Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate ACLs.
Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in NIST's Special Publication 800-83, Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops.
Contact Information
• 1-888-282-0870
NCCICCustomerService@us-cert.gov (UNCLASS)
us-cert@dhs.sgov.gov (SIPRNET)
us-cert@dhs.ic.gov (JWICS)
NCCIC continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.gov/forms/feedback/
Document FAQ
What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact US-CERT and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
Can I submit malware to NCCIC? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:
• Web: https://malware.us-cert.gov
• E-Mail: submit@malware.us-cert.gov
• FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous)
NCCIC encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on US-CERT's homepage at www.us-cert.gov.


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PostPosted: Fri Aug 10, 2018 8:37 am
 


The good thing is NK has a limited address space. Just block them, and Onion routers, and that's half the battle.


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PostPosted: Fri Aug 10, 2018 9:05 am
 


DrCaleb wrote:
The good thing is NK has a limited address space. Just block them, and Onion routers, and that's half the battle.


Amen.

I've done the same thing here despite the executive office saying that they don't have the political authority to do so. Fuck 'em. We have no business reason to expose ourselves to the Norks so I'll block the fuckers.

I'm one of two people who knows this and the other guy supports the idea, too. 8)


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PostPosted: Fri Aug 10, 2018 9:21 am
 


BartSimpson wrote:
DrCaleb wrote:
The good thing is NK has a limited address space. Just block them, and Onion routers, and that's half the battle.


Amen.

I've done the same thing here despite the executive office saying that they don't have the political authority to do so. Fuck 'em. We have no business reason to expose ourselves to the Norks so I'll block the fuckers.

I'm one of two people who knows this and the other guy supports the idea, too. 8)


PHBs aren't savvy enough to either ask nor figure out you ignore their arbitrary policy. But when you don't get hacked, they'll be grateful.


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PostPosted: Fri Aug 10, 2018 11:38 am
 


DrCaleb wrote:
PHBs aren't savvy enough to either ask nor figure out you ignore their arbitrary policy. But when you don't get hacked, they'll be grateful.


The reality is that when we don't have security threats going on they think I'm not doing anything. :|


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PostPosted: Fri Aug 10, 2018 3:10 pm
 


BartSimpson wrote:
DrCaleb wrote:
PHBs aren't savvy enough to either ask nor figure out you ignore their arbitrary policy. But when you don't get hacked, they'll be grateful.


The reality is that when we don't have security threats going on they think I'm not doing anything. :|

Classic security paradox.

"Why are we paying for this!? We never have an attack!"

"How did we get attacked, what did you do!?"


My Co-ordinator made it very clear right off the bat, have everything in writing. Whether it's a simple password change, a removal of an IDS for cost savings, or an order for a CEO to create an insecure access point cause he's a lazy idiot. Everything in writing, including my recommendation against whatever dumb shit they want. So if shit hits the fan, it's not my ass in the fire.

It's something I've tried to pass on to a few guys I work with, their boss loves telling them what to do over the phone, that they know 3 weeks later is going to blow up and he's going to deny it. I tell them to pull the call logs and either transcribe them, or have him send what he wants in an email so when he decides to be a slimy fuck and blame them for his stupidity, they throw it back at him.

Fucking hate that guy.


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