[Knoss]

$1:

So we develop the means to fight an entrenched, continuous line of enemy? Or a cavalry charge? We haven't had to do that in recent history.

We could go back to armored cars but then the trench would become an effective weapon again. It is note worthy that trech warfare was developed by African farmers to defeat lance cavalry and armered cars.

[SprCForr]

The irrigation ditches are cramping the LAV's in A'stan as well.

[grainfedprairieboy]

It generally takes about 15 years to bring a modern MBT into production from concept so the few new tanks you are seeing were commissioned following the cold war or at it's tail end and before fighting doctrine had been revised. One need look no further then the American army which was to replace the M1 in early 2000 but by 2004 had no serious replacement even on the drawing board.

The demise of the MBT has been predicted since Suez but designers countered each threat from infantry borne anti-tank weapons with increased or reactive armour forcing these anti-tank weapons to become increasingly heavier and impracticle for infantry to lug.

The next significant threat was the helo gunship which has the capability to destroy an unsuspecting tank at a distance of more than 5 km.

The death of the tank is to come at the hand of the C3/C4 systems that are now coming on stream which allow a ship parked 500 km off the coast and maybe 1500 km from of a battlefield to launch the weapon that is guided by GPS, controlled by satellite and orchestrated by some guy sipping coffee from a lounge chair in Denver.

Every weapon eventually becomes obsolete. One day even the infanteer for whom all this exists in support of, will be replaced.

[SprCForr]

toothpick toothpick:

WWI
- command on all sides conceptualizing the war (contrary to all available evidence) like the wars of the past.

It started out like the conflicts previous. The failure to recognize the impact of the machinegun, gas and aircraft was inevitable. It wasn't until after the fighting started that the impact became clear.

$1:

WWII
- Most of American Pacific Naval command flat out denying the value of aircraft. Overvaluing battleships like those that naval battles in WWI were fought with.
- undervaluation of heavy armor until it was rolling through France.
- much of the docterine at the time was based on the experiences of trench warfare and thus woefully inadequate to deal with blitzkreig (a form of which *was* practiced in the last part of WWI).

Your claim that "Generals are always prepared to fight the last war" fails. The German Generals obviously didn't or the Japanese Admirals. Or were you refering to only "our" generals?

$1:

The Iraq war
-assumption by many that it would be won like the first gulf war was won when a little forethought told anyone that there would be a signifigant and prolonged urban conflict. The US is just now buying some Golan urban combat vehicles from Israel. They don't need Bradleys or Abrams to patrol the streets, but that's what they had because that's what the last war there was fought with.

Test your Generals claim against the planning and operations of GW1. No military is set up to police urban area's. The Iraqi's were defeated using the tactics of GW1. Review the drive along the Euphrates. The tactic's were similar, but involved less manouevre elements. The potential for guerilla action was clearly identified. There were plans in place to supress that, but it relied heavily on manpower. The fact that the military is having problems suppressing guerilla activity stems primarily from the lack of troops on the ground immediatley after seizing the country. Those reduced troop numbers came directly from the political leadership (Rumsfeld amongst others) not the military. So I'd say the Generals did their job properly, but it was the US Gov't that pooched it.

$1:

It's not so much that things change, it's that command dosent. With the collape of the soviet union it took over a decade for programs like the Comache helicoptor to be cancelled. The Comache had one purpose: to help destroy Soviet armor in the event of an invasion of Western Europe. That's what that was geared for, yet it took over ten years after the fall of the USSR for that program to be scrapped.


Hiller said Canada dosent need tanks because we don't do anything that requires them. How does he know we won't need them? He dosen't, he said that because he was ready to fight the last war/conflct Canada was in.

Again, Generals aren't in the business of identifying future enemies. That falls into the realm of the political leadership. There is no way for Generals predict future world wide political changes. They are restricted to identifying potential threats. They can't fund for all contingencies, we wouldn't stand for it.
Cancellation of projects doesn't reflect your claim that "Generals are always prepared to fight the last war". All that is indicative of is inherent bureaucratic inertia. Besides with the way the USSR collapsed anything could have happened. Witness the coup attempts immediately after. What is Hillier saying about the subject of tanks now? His previous statement was reflective of government policy and the restrictions in manning and funding DND was facing at the time. Government policy about tanks hasn't changed since PET (he loathed them). The fact that we have the Leo's was a concession to our NATO partners for the defense of FRG. The Stryker program was an attempt to keep the large calibre direct fire capability in a cheaper common platform that wouldn't offend Canadian political sensibilities.

toothpick toothpick:

They develop an army to counter all the threats of past conflicts without searching for ways to counter threats the army has not faced in recent history.

$1:

Then I Then I:

So we develop the means to fight an entrenched, continuous line of enemy? Or a cavalry charge? We haven't had to do that in recent history.

You You:

See, that's the exact thinking that causes the problem. "Havent faced in recent history" != "have faced in history waaaay back". That's still thinking in terms of the past.

I was being sarcastic in response to a garbled comment, I guess I failed in projecting that. I'll use your own words to ask: What threat have we not considered that we have not faced in recent history? Again, demonstrate how the implementation of the "3 Block War" doctrine fails.

Bottomline is that statements like "Generals..." is claptrap. Piss poor attempts to classify something in a neat pithy comment where fact isn't required.

To wit:

All lawyers are shysters.
All politicians are scum.
All cops are crooked.
Those that can't, teach.
Soldiers are lazy bums who couldn't get a real job.

And so, on and so on...

Edit done to fix the obvious spelling mistakes.

[MaelstromRider]

grainfedprairieboy grainfedprairieboy:

It generally takes about 15 years to bring a modern MBT into production from concept so the few new tanks you are seeing were commissioned following the cold war or at it's tail end and before fighting doctrine had been revised. One need look no further then the American army which was to replace the M1 in early 2000 but by 2004 had no serious replacement even on the drawing board.

The demise of the MBT has been predicted since Suez but designers countered each threat from infantry borne anti-tank weapons with increased or reactive armour forcing these anti-tank weapons to become increasingly heavier and impracticle for infantry to lug.

The next significant threat was the helo gunship which has the capability to destroy an unsuspecting tank at a distance of more than 5 km.

The death of the tank is to come at the hand of the C3/C4 systems that are now coming on stream which allow a ship parked 500 km off the coast and maybe 1500 km from of a battlefield to launch the weapon that is guided by GPS, controlled by satellite and orchestrated by some guy sipping coffee from a lounge chair in Denver.

Every weapon eventually becomes obsolete. One day even the infanteer for whom all this exists in support of, will be replaced.

Some valid points, but...

The C3/C4, PGM, lead with senses, effect based operations approach that you appear to be lauding doesn't seem to have worked to great effect in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Sensors, C3I technology and precision munitions are highly effective force multipliers and are just the thing if you want to track down an enemy division... unfortunatley Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents can't field a mechanized infantry division, so our grandiose plans of slimming down our "Act" capability and compensating using "Command" and "Sense" may have to be forstalled for awhile, or at very least applied with a little more focus on the effects we aim to achieve rather than trying to pigeon hole us in concepts. In the end, troops in contact win the battle and hold the ground, not coffee sipping admirals launching three-quarter million dollar PGMs from 30km offshore. Counter insurgency and stabilty operations are doomed to fail if this kind of heavy handed approach is used. Considering that the warfare we anticipate in the near future is likely to be urban and against an elusive, insurgent enemy, I think maybe it's a little premature to say the tank is done. Notabley, the CF seems to have rethought the issue too...

Tanks still represent the best, most cost effective way to stop bullets from tearing up infantry while they do the business on the objective. They're also a much more cost effective weapon to use for busting up enemy fortifications - HESH rounds cost about $2000. Certainly we'll need to reconsider the way we employ tanks and may have to adopt a more flexible mindset to break away from the idea that tanks should never travel in less packs of four, but this is a matter of how to rewrite our doctrine, not reinvent equipment.

One last thing from high atop my tanker soapbox: the supported arm is the arm that is best suited to accpomplish the commander's main effort. Most often this is the infantry, however any manoeuvfre arm can be supported by another. Tanks and infantry are therefore mutually supporting - the infantry are exclusively supported.

[grainfedprairieboy]

Now I'd expect an old zipperhead to think that the role of infantry is to support armour but it is the other way around and all missions of the tankies in support of the commanders objectives are ultimately one and the same with the infantry.

The tank will not disappear tomorrow as it still has some uses and true enough the C4 systems are still being perfected but these systems will revolutionise warfare the same way air power has. When I can effectively locate and destroy targets from another hemisphere you have to agree it has outlived its practical usefulness. But so long as the current focus is on a technologically inferior enemy there has been no need to upgrade.

25 years ago every country in NATO was either actively designing or cooperating in another country's desing of the next generation MBTs. Today I'd be surprised if there was even 1 serious program anywhere that was not simply an upgrade over an existing model.

[toothpick]

SprCForr SprCForr:

And so, on and so on...

So, in other words, "Generalizations are usually false"?

[SprCForr]

That's it?